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NOTES

Class Actions for Punitive Damages
INTRODUCTION

Two recent decisions, In re Federal Skywalk Cases (Federal
Skywalk Cases) 1 and In re: Northern .District of Cal!fornia ".Dalkon
Shield" IU.D Products Liability Litigation (.Dalkon Shield) 2 have
raised the question whether a federal court can certify a class action
for punitive damages under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 The trial courts in both of these cases theorized that
where a defendant4 has injured numerous plaintiffs, the risk of multiple punitive damages judgments would produce one of two undesirable results. First, courts fearing that punitive awards already had
severely punished a given defendant might refuse to award punitive
damages to later plaintiffs. Thus, the first plaintiffs to bring their
claims to judgment would dispose of the right of later plaintiffs to
seek punitive awards. 5 Alternatively, courts would allow plaintiffs to
pursue their punitive claims in every action, thus subjecting defendants to multiple punitive awards and the risk of bankruptcy. 6 In
either instance, the fund available for punitive recovery would be
limited, establishing a basis for class certification under Rule
23(b)(l).7
1. 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342
(1982). The action arose from the collapse of two skywalks in the Hyatt-Regency Hotel in
Kansas City, Missouri on July 17, 1981. The disaster left 113 dead and 212 injured. 1500 to
2000 persons who were in the lobby of the hotel when the accident occured were in a position
to seek damages for emotional distress. By January 25, 1982, 150 suits had been filed either in
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri or the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, Missouri. The federal district court certified a Rule 23(b)(l)(A) class action on the
issue of liability for compensatory and punitive damages, and a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action
on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages. 93 F.R.D. at 419.
2. 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacatedandremandedsubnom. Abed v. A.H. Robins
Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Thousands of women
allegedly had been injured by a defective IUD called the Dalkon Shield. The device produced
uterine perforations, infections, spontaneous abortions, and fetal injuries. The district court
certified a nationwide class action consisting of plaintiffs seeking punitive damages against
A.H. Robins Co. 526 F. Supp. at 921.
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
4. Although this Note refers throughout to a single defendant, the reasoning involved also
applies where several defendants injure numerous plaintiffs. In addition, this Note assumes
that most tortfeasors will be corporations because most of the cases dealing with the problem
of multiple litigation for punitive damages involve corporate defendants.
5, Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424; IJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898, 918.
6, Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424; IJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 897.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l); see Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 419; IJalkon Shield,
526 F. Supp. at 896-900.
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The Ninth Circuit vacated the certification order in '.Dalkon
Shield, holding that the class was not maintainable under the prerequisites of Rule 23(a). 8 The Eighth Circuit vacated class certification .in Federal Skywalk Cases on the ground that the district court's
order violated the Anti-Injunction Act9 by enjoining pending state
court proceedings. 10
Nevertheless, the problems caused when numerous plaintiffs seek
punitive damages against a defendant justify the use of Rule 23. Punitive awards are often quite high in individual actions where such
damages are sought, 11 and potential liability soars when many plaintiffs seek punitive damages. 12 Moreover, incidents giving rise to
mass actions for punitive damages are likely to occur in the future. 13
This Note argues that a Rule 23 class action offers the best way to
manage multiple actions for punitive damages. 14 It begins by exam8. 693 F.2d at 851. The court observed that it was "not necessarily ruling out the class
action tool as a means for expediting multi-party product liability actions in appropriate cases,
but the combined difficulties overlapping from each of the elements of Rule 23(a) preclude[d]
certification in this case." 693 F.2d at 851.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976); see part III infra.
10. 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
11. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; see, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal,
App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (jury verdict for $125 million in punitive damages
reduced to $3.5 million by trial court); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660 n.2,
437 N.E.2d 910, 914 n.2 (1982) (citing a $10.5 million punitive award in California and an
$850,000 punitive award in the MER/29 drug liability litigation in New York); K. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.2(A)(2), at 82-83 (1980) (reporting that each of 40 cases handled by a
Chicago firm in the MER/29 drug liability litigation sought $500,000 in punitive damages);
Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 1, 1 n.l (1980); Note,Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill,
30 HAsTINGS LJ. 1797, 1797 n.6 (1979).
12. ''When all of the litigation concerning these issues is concluded, punitive totals may
reach staggering levels given the volatile nature of the claims involved and the amount of
compensatory damages prayed for." Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members
Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1981); cf. Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving
how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be
so administered as to avoid overkill.").
In Dalkon Shield, the total of multiple punitive claims against defendant A.H. Robins ex•
ceeded three billion dollars. 526 F. Supp. at 888; see also In re: Northern Dist. of Cal.
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order
conditionally certifying class action). Prior to the court's conditional certification, defendant
A.H. Robins had already lost two jury verdicts on punitive damages, one for $75,000 and the
other for $6.2 million. 521 F. Supp. at 1193. Similarly, plaintiffs in Federal Skywalk Cases
sought a total of over $1 billion in compensatory damages and $500 million in punitive damages. 93 F.R.D. at 419. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at AS, col. 1 (Midwest ed.) (reporting
450 lawsuits arising out of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, in which plaintiffs
claimed a total of $600 million in compensatory and $2 billion in punitive damages).
13. "In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons suffering the
same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a defendant
is becoming increasingly frequent." Da/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 892. The trend favors an
award of punitive damages in such cases. See 526 F. Supp. at 900; K. REDDEN, supra note 11,
§ 4.2(A)(2), at 85-86.
14. Punitive damages pose a greater risk of producing a limited fund than compensatory
damages do for three reasons. First, punitive recovery may be limited by law in situations
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ining the policy underlying punitive damages and the plaintiffs interest in recovering them. It then explains why a limited fund is
created when courts deny punitive damage recovery as a matter of
law or when punitive claims exceed defendant's as~ets. The Note
contends that a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) 15 class action provides the best
means to manage this limited fund and reviews the circumstances in
which a district court may properly certify a class action for punitive
damages. It then examines the consequences of (b)(l)(B) certification and concludes that a class action provides the best way to protect the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial system.
The Note concludes by explaining why principles of federalism do
not preclude class certification orders that effectively enjoin pending
state court proceedings.
l.

CLASS ACTIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. The Plaint!fis Interest in Recovering Punitive .Damages
The law exacts punitive damages to deter 16 and punish 17 culpable
defendants. 18 Punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff, exacted for society's benefit and not for individual compensation. 19
Consequently, the plaintiff has no right to recover punitive damages;
they are awarded at the discretion of. the trier of fact. 20
where compensatory awards will not be. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text. Alternatively, punitive damages awards may be as high as jury discretion and the court allow. See
note 20 infra and accompanying text. Because of their size, punitive damages are more likely
than compensatory damages to threaten a defendant's assets and thus to create a limited fund.
See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text. Third, while compensatory recovery alone
may not threaten a defendant's financial solvency, punitive and compensatory damages together might do so. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.RD. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on
other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); notes 31-40 infra
and accompanying text. Thus, punitive damages create problems that warrant special consideration.
In some cases, compensatory damages alone may produce a limited fund. If so, a court can
use the analysis presented in this Note to determine whether certification of a (b)(l)(B) class
for compensatory damages is appropriate. As far as justification for certification is concerned,
however, this Note restricts itself to the special dilemmas of punitive damages.
15. FED. R. CN. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
16. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.13,
at 130; Note, Punitive .Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of
Overkill, 13 PAC. L.J. 1273, 1277 (1982).
17. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 23-24.
18. Misconduct coupled with malice usually describes a case for punitive damages. Extreme misconduct indicating conscious or criminal indifference to the safety of others will also
render a defendant liable for punitive damages. See D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 205.
19. E.g., .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, Punitive .Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv
1173, 1177 n.7 (1931); Note, supra note 11, at 1808.
20. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp.
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Nevertheless, two considerations require a court to protect a
plaintiff's interest in seeking21 punitive damages. First, fairness demands that each plaintiff have an equal opportunity to sue for punitive damages. If the fund available for recovery is limited, the court
should manage the litigation so that it does not "become an unseemly race to the courtroom door with monetary prizes for a few
winners and worthless judgments for the rest." 22 Second, each plaintiff has a practical interest in the recovery of punitive damages. Such
awards often provide a plaintiff with the means to defray litigation
expenses,23 especially attorney's fees. 24 A plaintiff unable to seek punitive damages might not sue at all; 25 moreover, because attorneys
often handle claims on the basis of contingent fees, 26 punitive damages may provide the only way to make a claimant whole. 27 Thus,
while punitive damages are not designed to compensate the plaintiff,28 their availability may as a practical matter be dispositive of the
effectiveness of a plaintiff's suit.
at 898-99; Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, in THE CASE
AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Morris, supra note 19, at
1189.
21, In Dalkon Shield, for example, the court observed that "[p]laintiffs have no right to, or
vested interest in, punitive damages. Plaintiffs do, however, have a right to seek punitive damages. It is this right to seek that the consequences of individual actions will impair." 526 F.
Supp. at 898 n.37 (emphasis in original).
22. Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); accord Federal Skywalk Cases,
93 F.R.D. 415,424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
23. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.2(A)(2), at 84; see Duffy, supra note 20, at 5.
24. W. PROSSER,supra note 19, § 2, at II, 13; K. REDDEN,supra note II,§ 4.2(A)(2), at 84.
In states that authorize punitive damages, many courts permit juries to consider plaintiffs
litigation expenses, including attorney fees, in fixing the amount of punitive damages. Because
this practice goes to punishment and not compensation, it does not violate the American rule
against the award of attorney's fees. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 197; see, e.g., Cox v.
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972); Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96,
434 P.2d 828 (1967); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970).
25. See Roginsky v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); State ex rel.
Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980); D. DOBBS,supra note 16, § 3.9, at
205; K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 37; Putz & Astiz, supra note 12, at 4.
26. See R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS 75, 77 (Federal Judicial
Center 1980); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1957); J, MCGINN,
LAWYERS: A CLIENT'S MANUAL 65 (1979).
27. Contingent fee financing may impose a Hobson's choice on a plaintiff, forcing her
either to surrender a percentage of her recovery or to relinquish all hope of being made whole.
See R. ARONSON, supra note 26, at 77-78 (citing J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 50 (1976)).
The lawyer's share of the recovery may in some cases prevent the plaintiff from being fully
compensated. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 64-65 (1964). By
increasing plaintiffs total recovery, and thus the share that plaintiff receives after deduction of
attorney's fees, punitive damages improve her chances of being made whole.
28. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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B. The Limited Fund

Multiple punitive damage actions injure a plaintifrs interest in
one of two ways. First, early punitive judgments may lead a court to
rule that a defendant has been punished enough, thus depriving later
plaintiffs of any p:umtive recovery. 29 Alternatively, courts will not
limit recovery, in which case multiple individual awards may exhaust the assets available for recovery by later plaintiffs. 30 Both results produce a limited fund in which all plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages have an interest.

I. Limited Fund Created by A .Defendant's Bankruptcy
A limited fund will most likely appear when plaintifrs multiple
punitive claims exceed defendant's assets. Although some courts
have indicated a desire to limit punitive damages when many plaintiffs sue few defendants, 31 most authorities state that the courts cannot effectively control multiple punitive damages claims. 32 This
inability to limit the total amount of punitive damages awarded
against a particular defendant increases the risk that the defendant
will be bankrupted,33 especially since insurance usually does not
29. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 31-40 infra and accompanying text.
31. JJa/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898; see also deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d
1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970) (the court balanced potential burdens of punitive damage liability
against doubtful improvement in enforcement of securities laws and refused to allow punitive
damages in private action under Rule l0b-5); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1285-87 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (extent of punitive liability an
element of court's decision not to allow punitive damages under§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)); Roginsk.y v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir.
1967) (where consequences of punitive damages were great, proof of punitive damages was
subject to special scrutiny). Although the Roginsky court ostensibly found that punitive damages could not be awarded under New York's gross negligence standard, 378 F.2d at 851, its
holding may have been motivated by concern about punitive damage overkill. See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.2(A)(2), at 83.
32. The court in Roginsk.y v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), observed
that "[w]e know ofno principle whereby the first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and would thus preclude future judgments • . . . Neither does it seem either fair
or practicable to limit punitive recoveries to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving
it to some unascertained court to cry, 'Hold, enough,' in the hope that others would follow."
378 F.2d at 839-40; accord deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. ·
1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980). ·
Similarly, the district court in Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on
other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), stated that it would
be "utter naivete" not to conclude that many punitive damages suits would be tried. 93 F.R.D.
at 423. This result is especially likely in a state that requires mutuality of estoppel, because an
action between one plaintiff and defendant would not preclude the punitive damage issue for
subsequent plaintiffs. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 392 (D. Mass. 1979).
33. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1967); Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 898-99 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and
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cover a defendant's punitive liability.34
The specter of bankruptcy is far more worrisome than a limited
fund created by refusing to award punitive damages to plaintiffs. A
fund limited by legal restrictions compromises only the plaintiff's interest in recovery. In contrast, bankruptcy harms the plaintiffs, the
defendant, the defendant's creditors, the defendant's employees and
society in general. First, it affects the interest of plaintiffs whose
claims come to judgment after the defendant goes bankrupt. 35 It
does so by preventing late-suing plaintiffs from seeking punitive
damages, thus depriving them of a legally protected interest. 36
Moreover, defendant's bankruptcy bars the compensatory recovery
of late-suing plaintiffs, thus compromising their legal right to be
made whole.37 Second, society suffers because constructive bankruptcy may destroy an otherwise socially valuable defendant who is
responsible for a single egregious error. 38 Finally, bankruptcy inremanded sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S.
Ct. 817 (1983); Fround v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 659-60, 437 N.E.2d 910, 914-15
(1982) (Sullivan, P.J., specially concurring); D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9 at 212; Morris,
supra note 19, at 1195; see Note, supra note 16, at 1273 n.3.
34. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187 n.10 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting)
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Logan, Liability Insurance Protection From Punilve Damages in THE CASE AGAINST PuNITIVE DAMAGES 24-25 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969).
Some states prohibit recovery as a matter of public policy, reasoning that if punitive damages
are to deter a potential tortfeasor, they must come from this pocket and not the insurer's, K.
REDDEN,supra note 11, § 4.13, at l30;see W. PROSSER,supra note 19, § 2, at 13; Logan,supra,
at 25; see also Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483, 484 (1982) (remand) ("The insurance
carriers contend that their policies with the defendants do not provide coverage for punishable
acts . . . ."). The few states that do allow coverage do so only if the insurance contract so
provides. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.13, at 130; Logan, supra, at 24.
35. Although a bankruptcy court can distribute a defendant's assets in a way designed to
protect all creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. V 1981), the bankruptcy trustee would not be able
to avoid payment of a judgment disbursed more than ninety days before the date that
defendant filed in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(Supp. V. 198l);see Note, Class Cerly'icalion in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b}(I), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1157 n.62 (1983).
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code would not prevent early plaintiffs from racing to the courthouse in
order to receive a punitive damages windfall at the expense of late-suing claimants.
More important, however, is the fact that "it is very difficult to collect anything from one
who has gone bankrupt." D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 304 (1978); see
note 55 infra. This Note argues that once a defendant has been driven into bankruptcy, the
disadvantages that a class action can control have already accrued.
36. The court in Dalkon Shield noted that 1,573 claims aggregating over 2.3 billion dollars
in punitive damages had been filed against defendant A.H. Robins. The court continued:
"The potential for the constructive bankruptcy of A.H. Robins, a company whose net worth is
$280,394,000.00, raises the unconscionable possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who are
not first in line at the courthouse door will be deprived of a practical means of redress." 526 F.
Supp. at 893. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text.
37. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 212 ("heavy, multiple, and uncoordinated" punitive
awards might exhaust defendant's assets and deprive later claimants of compensatory
recovery).
38. The court in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), stated
that "a sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life of a concern that
has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have continued to do so in the future,
with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single management sin." 378 F.2d at 841; see also Note, supra note 11, at 1797. Punitive damages should
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jures employees,39 shareholders, consumers, and creditors who ultimately bear the burden of a corporate defendant's tortious error. 40
2. Limited Fund Created by Legal Restrictions on the Award of
Punitive .Damages

A limited fund also exists when the law prevents some or all
plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages. This result occurs in
two situations. First, state lawn might limit the number of punitive
recoveries against a given defendant,42 in which case a court would
allow only the first verdict-winning plaintiff to recover punitive damages.43 This outcome disposes of the interest that later plaintiffs have
"sting, not kill, a defendant." .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; accord Maxey v.
Freightliner, 450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226,
232 (M.D. Fla. 1974); International Union of Operating Engrs. v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1980).
The punitive award should deter the potential tortfeasor by making any contemplated wrong
unprofitable. In the area of products liability, for example, a "well-calibrated punitive award
might make the producer perfect the product ..•." Note, supra note 11, at 1799. Inasmuch
as the law's goal is to deter and not to destroy tortfeasors,see note l6supra and accompanying
text, courts should administer punitive damages awards both to preserve and deter culpable
defendants.
39. Even if the defendant does not or cannot file for bankruptcy, jobs may be lost. See
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tori Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1983) ("Manville might be forced to liquidate in full or in part and
thereby to eliminate a large number of jobs.").
40. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). If stockholders
do not bear the burden, the costs ofpunitve damages will probably be passed on to consumers.
See D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 213.
41. Because the measure of damages is a substantive issue, state law governs the measure
of damages in diversity cases. D. DoBBS,supra note 16, § 1.4, at 12. A federal court weighing
the merits of a diversity class action must apply the punitive law of the state in which it sits.
See Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 704 (C.D. Cal. 1977), revd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.
1980).
42. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds,
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). The court noted that Missouri law
might allow only one award of punitive damages against a single defendant. Despite the
court's fears, and the possibility that future laws will limit the number of punitive judgments,
no jurisdiction "has considered and adopted the one bite/first comer approach to punitive
damages." State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980).
If a state court does so hold, the state's substantive interest in the distribution of the judgment might preclude an alternative distributional scheme. That is, if state law stipulated that
only one plaintiff could recover a punitive judgment, the state's substantive interest in determining who may recover could prevent a federal court sitting in diversity from distributing a
judgment to multiple plaintiffs. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); note 41 supra.
If, on the other hand, the state allowed only one judgment but did not specify to whom it must
be awarded, a distribution of the judgment would arguably be a procedural question within
the power of the federal court. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
43. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
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in seeking punitive recovery.
Second, a court may refuse to award punitive damages to later
plaintiffs if it decides that previous individual judgments have sufficiently punished a defendant for a particular o.ffense,44 or that the
risk of financially destroying the defendant is unacceptable. 45 If one
or more courts so held, plaintiffs bringing suit in those courts would
be denied their interest in seeking punitive damages.
C. Potential Means To Control Punitive Awards

Given that most courts will allow punitive damages where many
plaintiffs sue a single defendant,46 the next question is whether a
44. [T]he existence of conflicting interests among plaintiffs as to a limited punitive damage "fund" is a conceptual certainty . . . • [I)t requires no clairvoyant power to conclude
that judges in subsequently filed lawsuits will rule as a matter of law that the defendants
have been punished enough and dismiss a plaintitrs claim for exemplary damages.
JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 918; accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483,487 (1982)
(remand) ("Missouri law, at the very least, does not permit undiminished multiple punitive
damage awards.").
45. See note 31 supra.
46. Many co=entators have made a plausible case for the abolition of punitive damages.
See generally THE CASE AGAINST PuNITIVE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); K.
REDDEN,supra note 11, §§ 7.4-7.8; Note,supra note 11, at 1802 nn.27-30. More recently, commentary has called for the curtailment of punitive damages, limiting their availability to certain narrowly defined categories of tortious behavior. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in 1/1e
Law of Punitive JJamages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. l (1982); see also Wheeler, The Consliluliona/
Case for Reforming Punitive JJamages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
The contrary argument defends punitive damages as essential to compensate plaintiffs and
to deter defendants. Where the defendant enjoys greater resources than the plaintiff, the prospect of punitive liability serves as an important equalizer in settlement negotiations. Punitive
damages also help defray actual litigation expenses, bringing the plaintitrs ultimate compensation closer to the value of the damages sustained. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying
text.
Some authorities have also argued that mere compensatory damages are insufficient to
deter corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
812, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (1981) (condemning auto manufacturer's "cost-benefit analysis
balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits"); Morris, supra note 19, at 1185,
1187; Owen,Punilive JJamages in Products Liability Litigation, 14 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1323-24
(1976). This argument amounts to an attack on the accuracy of compensatory damage awards,
rather than a claim for deterrence beyond the value of the injuries actually caused by tortious
conduct. Contemporary tort theory in factfavors "cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives
and limbs against corporate profits," for this process offers the only method of reaching the
optimal level of risk. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); w. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965); R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed.
1977); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Fletcher,Fairnessand l/tilityin Tori Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972); Posner,A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). Punitive damages beyond
the losses actually sustained would, if effectively awarded, overdeter legitimate economic activity. But all this assumes an accurate measurement of the economic value of life and limb, a
measurement fraught with uncertainties and arrived at by different juries in different ways.
See, e.g., Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PRODS. 5
(1976). Punitive damages may serve the critical function of enabling juries to assess more
accurately the extent to which society will impose the value of life as a constraint on economic
activity.
All but four states - Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington - allow puni-
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court should attempt to limit the total punitive award against a given
defendant. As a practical matter, courts are not likely to control effectively multiple punitive damage awards against · a single
defendant. 47
Two alternatives, however, bear brief examination. First, evidence of a defendant's assets can be presented to the jury,48 and
might lead it to fashion an appropriate award in a single action.
Where many plaintiffs seek punitive recovery, however, instructions
concerning a defendant's wealth will not lead to balanc~d awards if
each jury proceeds without knowing what the others are doing.
Moreover, knowledge of a defendant's wealth may prejudice some
juries against the tortfeasor,49 thus compounding the risk of a high
award. Second, after a verdict finding that defendant is liable for
punitive damages, a court could instruct the jury as to prior punitive
recovery awarded for the same offense. This information could be
used in fixing damages. so If this instruction persuades a jury to reduce or eliminate a potential award of punitive damages, it will
prejudice the interests of affected plaintiffs.s 1 On the other hand, the
jury may use prior punitive awards to conclude that the defendant
deserves even more punishment,52 thus aggravating the risk of defendant's bankruptcy.
Because punitive damages create a limited fund, the claims of the
plaintiffs should be brought before a single court for unitary adjudication. Aside from bankruptcy proceedings and interpleader, a class
action provides the only means to achieve this result. Moreover, a
class action is superior to either of these two alternatives. A bankruptcy court should not hear collateral punitive claims against a
debtors 3 and will in any event be constrained to use Rule 23 to join
tive damages. "The acceptance of punitive damages in most other jurisdictions appears to be
too popular and well-established to be discarded. Rationales such as compensation, punishment and deterrence, revenge, and the promotion of justice perpetuate its existence in remedial
law." K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 24; accord W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 2, at 11.
Punitive damages have become a settled feature of American tort law. As long as courts
continue to award them, both plaintiffs and defendants deserve protection against the arbitrary
or unfair extraction and allocation of the punitive damages windfall. As this Note argues, the
best vehicle for implementing that protection is the class action.
47. See note 32 supra.
48. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981); Weisenberg v. Molina,
58 Cal. App. 3d 478, 490; 129 Cal. Rptr. 813, 820 (1976); D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at
218-19.
. 49. Morris, supra note 19, at 1191.
50. JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898 & n.39; State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or.
61, 618 P.2d 1263, 1273-74 (1980); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at § 4.8; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 co=ent 3 (1979); Morris, supra note 19, at 1195.
51. JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898; see notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
52. Morris, supra note 19, at 1195 n.40; Note, supra note 11, at 1806-07.
53. First, the bankruptcy court probably lacks power to hear such claims. See Northern
Pipe Line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982); Winter, Bankmptcies
Create Asbestos Case Turmoil, 68 A.B.AJ. 1361 (1982); cf. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4,
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plaintiffs affected by a defendant's bankruptcy.54 More important,
the fact that a defendant has been driven to bankruptcy by punitive
claims means that the defendants, plaintiffs, and society have already been injured.55 lnterpleader56 is inadequate because the defendant's lack of control over a stake in controversy would preclude
joinder of punitive damages claimants. 57
col. l (late ed.) (representatives of Johns-Manville, filing under Chapter 11, argue that bankruptcy court is the most appropriate place to apportion damages where creditors' claims exceed
assets); note 82 infra.
Second, even if Congress alters the bankruptcy courts to allow them to hear collateral
claims, "(t]he policies underlying the doctrines of pendent jurisdiction and the right to trial by
jury suggest that the bankruptcy court should leave the estimation of individual claims to state
courts and other federal courts." Note, supra note 39, at 1123; see also id. at 1136-41.
54. See l l U.S.C. app. at 1349 (1976); Note, supra note 39, at 1133-34 (bankruptcy rules
incorporate FED. R. C1v. P. 23). Thus, a bankruptcy court wishing to certify a class action on
claims for punitive damages should use the approach discussed in Part II infra.
55. See notes 3l-40supra and accompanying text. Johns-Manville's decision to file under
Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (Supp. V. 1981), see note 82 infra, illustrates the problems
that arise when a defendant is driven into bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 filing automatically
stayed all litigation against Manville. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979); see Winter, supra
note 53, at 1361. Thus, Manville's move may have amounted to "an effort to evade thousands
oflaw suits filed by severely ill workers . . . ." Miller, Don't Let Industry Shirk Its Duty, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (late ed.); see Note, supra note 39, at 1122 ("Manville thus
appears to be attempting to use the bankruptcy power largely as a tool to limit the aggregate
size of its current and future liabilities." (footnote omitted)); N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4,
col. l. The Chapter 11 filings may also stay proceedings against all defendants in actions in
which Manville is a codefendant. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 11 Bankr. 294 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1981) (plaintiff cannot dismiss reorganization debtor and proceed only against codefendants); Winter, supra note 53, at 1361. Even if§ 362(a) stays proceedings only against
the debtor in bankruptcy, other defendants will likely file under Chapter 11 to escape or at
least postpone liability. Winter, supra note 53, at 1361; see note 82 infra. In short, Manville's
move injured the interests of affected plaintiffs.
In addition to claimants, "[t]he stockholders are going to take a pasting . . . and so are
some of the unsecured creditors . . . . Every day this stays in bankruptcy court, the likelihood
of their getting paid all they are owed diminishes." N.Y. Times, Sept. l, 1982, at D12, col. 5
(late ed.) (quoting Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., of Yale Law School). In fact, the value of
Manville's stock dropped from around seven or eight dollars a share before the filing to $4. 75 a
share by September l. See id., Sept. l, 1982, at DI, col. l.
The object is to prevent the defendant from going into bankruptcy in order to avoid these
consequences. A class action for punitive damages achieves this result.
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976) (statutory interpleader); FED. R. C1v. P. 22 (rule
interpleader).
57. Both statutory and rule interpleader are used to join adverse claimants when the stakeholder controls the fund in controversy. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1702, 1704, (1972). The party defending against punitive damages claims cannot interplead the plantiffs before a judgment is rendered because the amount of liability is
indeterminate: The defendant does not control the fund simply because it does not yet exist.
The defendant could argue that the first punitive judgment against it is the extent to which it
ought to be punished, and then interplead remaining plaintiffs using the first judgment as a
stake. The problem again is that the defendant does not control the fund after it is paid over to
the plaintiff. Moreover, this attetnpt would probably fail because it would not satisfy the adverse claimant requirement inherent in interpleader. See id. at § 1705. The claims of subsequent plaintiffs are adverse to defendant's assets, but not to the claim of a plaintiff who has
already received a punitive judgment. q. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 896 n.31 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (refusing to characterize plaintiffs' action against defendant as an "interpleader
situation" but observing that ''the amount of punitive damages recoverable against Robins is,
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In sum, because multiple punitive damages actions will create a
limited fund, the court must manage the action to produce an equitable result. A Rule 23 58 class action provides the best means to allow
society to punish the defendant effectively, to preserve the interests
of plaintiffs, and to protect socially valuable defendants.
II.

RULE 23(b)(l)(B) CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. Appropriateness of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) in the Context of the
Limited .Fund
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) 59 permits a court to certify a class action when
"adjudications with respect to individual members of the class . . .
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other
members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests."60 If state law limits a
fund, or if punitive claims absorb a defendant's assets, the interests
of late-suing plaintiffs will as a practical matter be disposed of. 61
The plaintiffs' interests in seeking punitive damages thus bring this
limited fund within the ambit of Rule 23(b)(l)(B).
A (b)(l)(B) class action provides the best means to manage a limited fund created by multiple punitive damage claims. The Advisory
Committee Comments state that
[i]n various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of
the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect
on the interests of other members who should therefore be represented
in the law suit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims . . . . 62

Moreover, while some courts have indicated that Rule 23(b)(l)(B) is
ordinarily inappropriate in an action for money damages, 63 an "indiat least in theory, a sum certain for interpleader purposes."), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
58. FED. R. C1v. P. 23.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l) provides that:
An action may be maintained as class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(l) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; ..•
61. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text.
62. Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966) (emphasis added).
63. E.g., Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976); McDonnell
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vidual action [that] inescapably will alter the substance of the rights
of others having similar claims . . . falls within Rule 23(b)(l)(B)." 64
For example, when numerous plaintiffs confront a fund limited by
statute, the court may certify a damages claim under Rule
23(b)(l)(B).65 Other cases indicate that certification should also follow when the law or the threat of bankruptcy limits the fund available for punitive recovery. 66 Thus, if punitive claims create a limited
fund, a court should use a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action to protect the
interests of affected plaintiffs.67
The other subdivisions of Rule 23(b) are not appropriate in a
class action for punitive damages. Rule 23(b)(2), which renders a
class action maintainable if the party opposing the class has acted so
Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1976); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968); Ziegler v. Gibralter
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 43 F.R.D. 169 (D.S.D. 1967).
64. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (quoting La Mar).
65. See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558,561 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd.
mem., 501 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975), where plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. The limited fund derived from 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976), which limits liability for owners
of seagoing vessels. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976) (limiting liability for a nuclear accident).
66. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal.
1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); see also
In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193
n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class action).
67. Several courts and commentators have suggested that the best way to manage punitive
damages is to make a single award covering all plaintiffs. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.11 (2d Cir. 1967) (if cases could be brought before a single court,
jury might be able to make appropriate award for distribution among all successful plaintiffs);
Proud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1982) (if defendants
fear backbreaking punitive damage awards, they should request that the trial court certify a
class action for punitive damages); Bartolo v. Boardwalk Regency Hotel Casino, 185 N.J.
Super. 540,546 n.l, 449 A.2d 1343, 1346 n.l (1982) (solution endorsed by courts and commentators "is to require all punitive damage claims based upon the same wrongful conduct to be
pursued together in a single class action"); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618
P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980) (class actions provide for unitary consideration of punitive damages);
K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.16, at 134 ("[T]here should only be one award of punitive
damages for the entire class of victims."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908 comment
e (1979) ("In a class action involving all claims, full assessment of the punitive damages can be
made."); Morris, supra note 19, at 1195 ("forced joinder" might be appropriate where multiple
plaintiffs sue a defendant). See generally Putz & Astiz, supra note 12.
Similarly, Rule 23 does not foreclose "the application of class action concepts to cases , • ,
in which repetitive litigation based on a single set of facts threatens to cause irreparable harm
both to the defendant and more importantly to thousands of plaintiffs left with a legal right but
potentially no adequate remedy." In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying "Dalkon
Shield" class action). Rule 23(b)(l)(B) will equitably distribute the limited fund to class members whose interests would otherwise be impaired or disposed of by damage awards that deplete the fund. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.·817
(1983).
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as to justify "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief to the class as a whole," does not apply to actions for money
damages.68 Similarly, Rule 23(b)(l)(A) ordinarily does not apply to
damage suits because judgments produced by such actions do not
"establish incompatible standards of conduct for a party opposing
the class."69
68. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523
F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1975); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,
790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975);
Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). This result also follows if the action seeks a declaratory judgment which does not correspond to final injunctive relief. "Declaratory relief'corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it affords injunctive
relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief. Subdivision (b)(2) does not extend to cases
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages."
Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. at 102. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United
States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 91 I (1976), the court
rejected the notion that a mass accident class action seeking declaratory relief could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The court stated that "subdivision (b)(2) by its own terms does not
apply to actions only for damages . . . . the declaratory relief sought by plaintiffs adds nothing to their claim for damages." 523 F.2d at 1087 (citations omitted). Because punitive damage awards fall within this prohibition, a class seeking punitive damages should not be
certified under subdivision (b)(2).
Contra In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972), where the court certified a
(b)(2) mass-accident class seeking declaratory relief on the question of liability without discussing the reasoning that supported certification under this subdivision. The court in Causey
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975), approved the result reached in
Gabel but rejected class certification under subdivision (b)(2). 66 F.R.D. at 397. In addition,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected Gabel in McDonnell Douglas. 523 F.2d
at 1087. The Gabel court erred because final relief was not injunctive but was related predominately to money damages; declaratory relief was merely an interim measure, not a final judgment. Note, Mass Accident Litigation, 40 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 320, 327 (1974).
69. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(l)(A). A defendant.facing multiple damage suits can avoid being
placed in a position of conflict simply by compensating some plaintiffs but not others. Causey
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D. Va. 1975); see, e.g., Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United
States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); La
Marv. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D.
382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660, 677 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 132 (E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 561 F.2d 434 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Landau v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 367 F. Supp. 992, 997
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
However, in regard to a limited fund, one could argue that a defendant would be forced to
act inconsistently if it were able to pay only some of the judgments rendered against it. See
Klenk & Kelly, Rule 23 (1966) Purpose & Prerequisites, in CLASS ACTIONS [2.42] at 2-47 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1974); cf. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,
424 (W.D. Mo.) (certifying a (b)(l)(A) class on the issue of liability for compensatory and
punitive damages), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
342 (1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying (b)(l)(A) class
action against limited fund because "adjudications awarding damages to individual members
of the class . . . might impose inconsistent standards of conduct upon defendants. . . ."); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd mem., 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975) ("a (b)(l)(A) class action is viable when a co=on fund exists that may be
evaporated by an award to some of the prospective claimants"); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Assn., 48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969) ("One suit might well order a payment of damages
and another might well forbid it."); 1 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS§ 1135a (1977) ((b)(l)(A)
classes have been certified in actions for money damages).
But if a limited fund exists, the action can be certified under subdivision (b)(l)(B). See
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Finally, a Rule 23(b)(3) "opt-out" class action would be inadequate because the limited fund created by multiple actions for punitive damages can be protected effectively only if all claimants are
joined in a single action.70 In fact, the most important consequence
of (b)(l)(B) certification is that class members cannot opt out; the
court's judgment thus binds all class members.71 This feature prevents plaintiffs from pursuing independent litigation72 that would as
a practical matter dispose of the interests of later plaintiffs. 73 Because (b)(l)(B) protects a limited fund by binding all class members,
it is the most appropriate subdivision under which to certify a class
action for punitive damages.

B. Finding the Limited Fund
Before a court can certify a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action for punitive damages, it must determine that a limited fund actually exists.
In cases where the presence of a limited fund is uncertain, courts will
not order a (b)(l)(B) class action.74 However, even those courts that
have refused to certify an action in such circumstances have held
notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text. Moreover if the class action is maintainable under
23(b)(l) at all, "nothing turns on which clause is controlling." Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. at424;accord 1 H. NEWBERG,supra, at§ 1130. Thus, although a court could conceivably certify a class action seeking a limited fund under subdivision (b)(l)(A), the more accurate
- and safer - approach would be to certify under subdivision (b)(l)(B).
70. The limited fund concept underlying (b)(l)(B) certification demands that a judgment
be binding on all class members. Because plaintiffs can opt out of a (b)(3) class action, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), those who do not wish to participate in the action could exhaust a
limited fund by winning the one or few punitive judgments that state law allows against a
single defendant, or by obtaining large judgments that threaten to exhaust a defendant's assets.
See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.8(0), § 4.16. Moreover, if a court finds that (b)(l)(B)
certification is warranted, it should certify the class under subdivision (b)(l)(B) rather than
(b)(3). See Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1 H. NBWBBRO,
supra note 69, at § 1146.
This is not to say that (b)(3) certification should never be used where plaintiffs face a limited fund. If a court concludes that other factors, such as the Anti-Injunction Act, see Part III
infra, preclude (b)(l)(B) certification, then a rule 23(b)(3) class action can be used as a nextbest option. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (1982) (remand); Payton v. Abbott
Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 392 (D. Mass. 1979). See generally Putz & Astiz, supra note 12 (urging
that plaintiffs who opt out of a class action for punitive damages be precluded from bringing
individual punitive claims). However, where a limited fund appears, (b)(l)(B) certification is
always preferable to maintaining the class under other Rule 23 subdivisions.
71. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1976); Dalkon
Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 906 & n.75 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983); Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, (2.7), at 2-14; Note, supra note 35, at 1152-53.
72. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978).
73. "Insofar as class actions which are brought under subsection (b){l) of Rule 23 are
concerned, the binding effect of a judgment on the class is necessary . . . to protect class members from adjudications which could dispose of their interests." Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69,
(2.7), at 2-14.
74. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847,851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979).
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open the prospect that Rule 23(b)(l)(B) could be used if the court
were certain that the fund was limited.75
Courts have not defined the legal showing required to establish
the presence of a limited fund. At most, the cases indicate when a
court may not certify a (b)(l)(B) class.76 But if the law of the forum
clearly indicates that only one punitive damage award may be recovered against a defendant, then the fund is clearly limited and should
be subject to a (b)(l)(B) class action. 77
Further, if a court considers certifying a (b)(l)(B) class action
against the limited fund created when plaintiffs' claims exceed a de75. Problems in proving the existence of a limited fund usually arise where plaintiffs
claims allegedly exceed defendant's assets. In In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) the court refused to certify a {b)(l)(B) class because the plaintiffs
had offered no evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants. 506 F. Supp. at 789-90.
The district court in Da/kon Shield, distinguished Agent Orange on that basis, holding in contrast that the Dalkon Shield claims posed a real threat of bankruptcy. 526 F. Supp. at 897.
Payton v. Abbott Labs, on the other hand, rejected plaintiffs' attempt to establish a group
insurance fund, paid for by defendants, as one remedy in a DES case. "The plaintiffs do not
. . . offer evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants, and I do not believe that, without
more, numerous plaintiffs and a large ad damnum clause should guarantee (b)(l)(B) certification." 83 F.R.D. at 389. Even so, no court has categorically ruled out a (b)(l)(B) class action
where plaintiffs' claims exceed defendant's assets.
Other cases indicate that (b)(l)(B) certification may be appropriate where plaintiffs' claims
threaten to bankrupt a defendant. In Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th
Cir. 1976), the court noted that (b)(l)(B) certification would be called for "where the claims of
all plaintiffs exceeded the assets of the defendant and hence to allow any group of individuals
to be fully compensated would impair the rights of those in court." 541 F.2d at 1340 n.9; cf.
Klenk & Kelly,supra note 69, at [2.45]. The court in Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.
Ky. 1977), relied in part on the language in Green in certifying a (b)(l)(B) class action where
claims arising from a nightclub fire exceeded the defendant's assets. 77 F.R.D. at 46.
However, the Ninth Circuit limited the Green footnote in Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. because
Green involved a !Ob-5 securities action and not "mass personal injury claims." 693 F.2d at
851. This distinction is not convincing because (b)(l)(B) certification turns on the presence of
a limited fund, not on the nature of the action. In addition, the Ninth Circuit left open the
possibility that adequate proof of threatened insolvency might warrant a class action:
The detrimental effect of earlier claims upon later claims co=ends itself to this court as
worthy of future judicial and legislative consideration. As plaintiffs in this case correctly
argue, though, not every plaintiff will prevail and not every plaintiff will receive a jury
award in the amount requested. Thus on the present state of the record, the detrimental
effect of separate punitive damages awards is not clearly inescapable.
693 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added). The few courts that have spoken to the issue thus do not
rule out (b)(l)(B) certification where plaintiffs' claims exceed a defendant's assets. What they
do require is evidence that such claims threaten to bankrupt the defendant.
16. See note 75 supra.
77. In Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), the district court read the Missouri
appellate court's decision in Monsanto Co. v. Parker, No. 43829 (Mo. Ct. App., argued Dec. 9,
1981), dismissed as moot, 634 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), as holding that only one punitive damage judgment would be allowed against a given defendant, and used this conclusion
as a partial justification for (b)(l)(B) certification. 93 F.R.D. at 424-25. The Eighth Circuit did
not reach the merits of the holding in vacating the lower court order, 680 F.2d at 1177 n.4, so
the notion that a court can certify a (b)(l)(B) class action to manage a fund limited by state law
retains precedential validity. See 680 F.2d at 1187 (Heaney, J., dissenting); cf. Hernandez v.
Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd mem., 501 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir.
1975) (fund limited by statute).
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fendant's assets, it should rely on evidence showing that the fund is
actually limited.78 Thus, the court must decide whether punitive
awards will exceed defendant's assets. Relevant evidence would mclude proof of defendant's actual assets, insurance, settlements, and
continuing exposure.79
The court should certify a (b)(l)(B) class action only if the evidence indicates that the plaintiffs' punitive claims threaten to bankrupt the defendant. The issue, therefore, turns on the standard of
certainty by which the court must test the proof. The trial court in
Dalkon Shield opined that "[n]either the rule nor the Advisory Committee Notes requires proof that claims 'will,' as a certainty, exhaust
the fund. Certification is appropriate if individual actions 'may' affect the claims of parties not before the court." 80 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this pronouncement, declaring instead that the record must
establish "that separate punitive awards inescapably will affect later
awards." 81 Although the standard imposed by the Court of Appeals
is more rigorous than that adopted by the trial court, it does not pose
an insurmountable barrier to (b)(l)(B) certification. Inasmuch as
multiple claims have caused defendants to file in bankruptcy in the
past, 82 it should be possible to document such a threat where it actu78. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub
_nom Abed v. A.H. Robins, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); cj
note 79 i'!fra; see also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MA•
JOR ISSUES AFFECTING COMPLEX LITIGATION 25 (1981) (trial court may authorize pre-certification discovery on issues relating to certification). Although discovery should be used to
determine whether a limited fund exists, it must not amount to an inquiry into the merits of the
action. 526 F. Supp. at 919; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
79. The Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's order certifying a class action for punitive
damages in part because the judge erred by ordering class certification without sufficient proof
of, or even inquiry into, the defendant's actual assets, insurance, settlement experience, and
continuing exposure. Although the district court conceded that discovery should be used to
identify a limited fund, see note 78 supra, it certified the class action solely on the basis of the
defendant's attorney's affidavit showing the claims against the defendant and its assets. 693
F.2d at 852. The court did not reopen discovery to permit plaintiffs to challenge the affidavits,
526 F. Supp. at 911-19;see 693 F.2d at 852. Moreover, the district court did not allow out-of•
state plaintiffs to participate in punitive damage class briefings. 693 F.2d at 852. Information
pertaining to a defendant's assets and the likelihood of insolvency can be obtained by in camera revelation. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other
grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); rf. Note, supra note 35, at
1158 ("Some form of evidentiary hearing will be necessary to determine the amount of assets
available for recovery, the potential number of awards, and the magnitude of the amount to be
recovered, but such a hearing should be quite limited.").
80. 526 F. Supp. at 891;seealso Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187 n.9 (Heaney,
J., dissenting) (Rule 23(b)(l)(B) does not require proof that claims will exhaust a defendant's
capacity to pay); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
81. 693 F.2d at 851.
82. For example, Johns-Manville faced 16,500 asbestos-related claims, N.Y. Times, Sept.
5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (late ed.), and anticipated that this number would rise to 32,000 as
latent injuries materialized. Id., Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. With potential liability estimated
at two billion dollars, Manville feared that the company would be unable to satisfy judgments
against it. Id As a result, Manville filed in bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11011174 (Supp. III 1979),joining UNR Industries and several smaller asbestos insulation makers
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ally exists. 83
Moreover, the trial court's standard is arguably more appropriate
than that used by the Court of Appeals for two reasons. First, the
hazards posed to plaintiffs, defendants, and society by bankruptcy84
suggest that a court should certify a (b)(l)(B) class action as a precautionary measure even where bankruptcy is not absolutely certain.
Second, the Advisory Committee's Comments state that (b)(l)(B)
certification is appropriate where "an adjudication as to one or.more
members of the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse
practical effect on the interests of other members . . . ." 85 Rule 23
itself states that a (b)(l) class action is appropriate if separate adjudications merely "risk" destroying or impairing the interests of nonparties. 86 Thus, the court would be justified in certifying a (b)(l)(B)
class action if multiple suits presented a "significant likelihood" that
individual claims would affect the interests of parties not before the
court. 87
C.

Conducting the Class Action

Once the court concludes that the fund available for punitive recovery is limited, it must then decide whether the other prerequisites
of class action are present. The number of plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages must render joinder impractical, the action must pose questions of law or fact common to the class, the punitive claims of the
class representatives must be typical of the entire class, and the representative parties must protect the interests of the class.88
The most important prerequisite in a class action for punitive
damages is commonality. Because a mass accident affects plaintiffs
in several jurisdictions, a court sitting in diversity may have difficulty
who had already been sent into bankruptcy. See Winter, supra note 53, at 1361; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1982, at 35, col. 3.
83. See Note, supra note 39, at 1121-22 ("Although Manville and UNR Industries are the
first such apparently healthy corporations to file Chapter 11 petitions in the face of massive
tort claims, manufacturers in a variety of industries that face similar liability could follow
suit." (footnote omitted)).
84. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
85. Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966) (emphasis added).
86. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(l); see Note, supra note 35, at I 158.
87. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1187 n.9 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
88. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representive parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
All four prerequisites must be met. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798
(5th Cir. 1982). The burden of establishing that a class meets these prerequisites lies with the
party seeking certification. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.13], at 2-17.
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isolating a punitive law common to all class members. 89 This problem is not insurmountable for three reasons. First, a punitive damage
class action poses common questions of fact going to the defendant's
culpability.90 Because Rule 23(a) requires only that the action present "questions oflaw or fact common to the class," 91 the court could
certify those issues relying on facts going to defendant's punitive liability and then apply the determination reached by the trier of fact to
the measure of damages. 92 Second, "the court could determine a
consensus of shared values or policies in formulating a 'compromise'
standard" of punitive recovery that would account for the interests
of all affected states. 93 Finally, the court must exclude from the class
those claimants who cannot recover punitive damages under applicable state law. 94
89. If the action is brought under a federal statute rather than diversity jurisdiction, federal
statutory or court-made law will control, thus providing a common question of law. D.
DOBBS, supra note 16, § 1.5, at 12. But if the suit is a diversity action, the federal court must
apply the choice of law provisions of the state in which it sits. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). If the wrong giving rise to multiple claims occurs in a single jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction uses the traditional lex loci delecli rule to determine whose law will
control, the court will apply the punitive damage standard of the state in which it sits, see note
41 supra, and no problem of commonality will arise. Comment, The Use of Class A clions for
Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Lov. L. REv. 383, 391 (1977). If, on the other hand, the wrong
affects persons in more than one jurisdiction, the law of the forum might require the court
sitting in diversity to apply different punitive damage laws to different members. For example,
half of the states deny punitive damages in cases where the plaintiff dies; in addition, standards
for recovery range from simple negligence to malice, fraud, and oppressive conduct. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.11, at 127. The Ninth Circuit adduced the differences in punitive
damages standards as one reason for denying certification in lJalkon Shield. 693 F.2d at 850.
However, the court went on to note that "[i]f commonality were the only problem in this case,
it might be possible to sustain some kind of a punitive damage class." 693 F.2d at 850.
90. Abed v. A.H. Robins, 693 F.2d at 850 (the court conceded that defendant's knowledge
of product safety, when defendant obtained such knowledge, what information defendant
withheld from public, and what defendant stated in advertising to doctors "may all be common questions."); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F.
Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class) (defendant's conduct
in manufacturing and marketing of Dalkon Shield presented common questions of law and
fact with respect to punitive liability); cf. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir.
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (facts relevant to liability will not differ meaningfully from one
defendant to another), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 628
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (right of each member of class to recover damages turns on a common set of
facts).
91. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) (emphasis added).
92. The court could take different laws into account when an individual from an affected
state makes his or her claim on the class fund. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 917. Alternatively, special verdicts or general verdicts with interrogatories could be used to apply different
punitive laws to various individuals or groups of individuals in a single trial. See FED. R. C1v.
P. 49(a), 49(b); Comment, supra note 89, at 393.
93. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 917. Although the precise measure of damages may
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, "[a]ll states in which punitive damages are allowed have
a shared interest in seeing that the alleged misconduct is punished." 526 F. Supp. at 909.
94. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 916 n.158. This result follows because plaintiffs without
punitive claims pose no threat to the limited fund. However, the court should consider the
viability of individual claims under applicable state law in assessing the risk that punitive
awards will exhaust defendant's assets. See notes 78-87 supra and accompanying text.
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The numerosity requirement is usually satisfied when punitive
claims are so numerous that they exceed a defendant's assets. 95
Where the law limits the number of possible punitive recoveries, the
95. The numerosity requirement is satisfied where joinder is impracticable. See, e.g., Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,421 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir. 1982) (class arising from accident where several hundred people had been killed or
injured held sufficiently numerous), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order
conditionally certifying class action) (1600 claims pending nationwide in state and federal
courts sufficiently numerous); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (concluding that a class consisting of the legal representatives of over 200 people killed or injured
in a fire satisfied the numerosity prerequisite). Joinder need only be impracticable, not impossible. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 346 (1976). A showing of "strong litigational inconvenience" satisfies the numerosity requirement. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 421 (W.D. Mo.) vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
Because a tort provides the most co=on reason to seek punitive damages, K. REDDEN,
supra note 11, at § 2.6, a mass tort is the paradigm situation in which the numerosity requirement will be satisfied. For example, both Federal Skywalk Cases and Dalkon Shield involved
mass torts. See notes l-2supra. This observation is important because the Advisory Co=ittee Co=ents indicate that class certification may not be appropriate in a "mass accident"
situation:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate
for a class action because of the likelihood that significiant questions, not only of damages
but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances an action would degenerate in practice into multiple law suits separately tried.
Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
This admonition does not bar (b)(l)(B) certification ofa class action for punitive damages
for four reasons. First, the co=ent states only that a class action will not "ordinarily" be
appropriate for a mass accident; it does not indicate that certification would never be called
for. Because punitive damages claims go to the defendant's conduct relative to a class of plaintiffs, (b)(l)(B) certification poses no risk of degenerating into multiple law suits.
Second, the Committee expressed its concern "with particular reference to subdivision
(b)(3) of the Rule." Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 396-97 (E.D. Va.
1975). In a (b)(3) situation, "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in" a (b)(l) or
(b)(2) class action. Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03. A (b)(3) class action allows "opt out" and requires notice, while actions maintained under (b)(l) and (b)(2) do
not. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2). Because a subdivision (b)(3) class action differs materially
from its subdivision (b)(l) or (b)(2) counterpart, the Advisory Committee's opposition to class
certification for mass accidents may apply only to actions arising under subdivision (b)(3).
Third, because Rule 23 itself does not prohibit a class action in a mass tort, it arguably
permits certification of a (b)(l) mass accident class action. In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 627
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (If Rule 23 was not intended to cover mass tort actions, "it would have been
simple enough to have said so in the text of the rule."); accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.342 (1982).
Finally, courts indicate that class certification can be used when the class action is limited
to a single issue, such as liability. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389-91 (D. Mass.
1979); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 560 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qjfd mem.,
507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc.,
47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir.
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (concerns expressed in Advisory Committee Co=ents simply
do not apply when facts relevant to punitive liability do not differ meaningfully from one
claimant to another), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). Even cases that have refused class
certification in a mass disaster admit that a court can use the device where it can limit class
issues. E.g., Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392,397 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hobbs v.
Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Thus, even if the punitive damages arise
from a mass tort, the court can still use (b)(1 )(B) class certification to protect a limited fund.
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number of plaintiffs may satisfy the numerosity prerequisite;96 however, the claims of few plaintiffs against such a fund would be better
managed by joinder.97
The typicality98 and adequacy of representation99 prerequisites
pose no problems unique to class actions for punitive damages. 100 In
any event, where doubt remains as to whether the prerequisites for a
punitive damage class are present, the court should resolve that
doubt in favor of certification. 101
Upon concluding that a limited fund exists and that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, the court should exercise its discretion to certify as soon as possible a class action consisting of all
persons who claim punitive damages against a particular defendant.102 The court should certify the class even if no party to the
96. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co,, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
97. In this sense, joinder would be practicable because only a few plaintiffs would be seeking a punitive award. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2) (person subject to service of process who
will not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction shall be joined if "he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
. . . ."); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder).
98. The claims will be typical if they arise from the same factual setting. Da/kon Shield,
526 F. Supp. at 900. The typicality requirement does not mandate total identity of interests
among class members. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D. Mass. 1979).
99. "Adequacy of representation depends on the qualifications and interests of counsel for
the class representatives, the absence of antagonism or conflicting interests, and a showing of
interests between.class representatives and absentees." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab, Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). In Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D.
Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), the
court held that representation was adequate where the class representatives were able to act as
fiduciaries in protecting class interests and possessed the resources needed to prosecute certified claims. The representatives had no conflicts of interests with other class members, were
not motivated by factors unrelated to the case itself, and had a substantial stake in the outcome
of the controversy. In addition, lead counsel was experienced in complex litigation and was
therefore qualified to conduct the action. 93 F.R.D. at 422. As to the adequacy of representatives' counsel, courts have considered counsel's pleadings and briefs, compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and litigation experience. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.35],
at 2-41; see Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (representation adequate
where lead counsel was experienced in tort class action litigation and in the substantive law of
Kentucky).
100. Two additional requirements often inferred from Rule 23 - that the class must be
identifiable and that the class representatives must be members of the class - also present no
difficulty peculiar to a (b)(l)(B) action for punitive damages. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
101. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.13], at 2-17.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l) provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be so maintained." The court can always alter the order if facts develop that lead the court to
revise its position. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 918-19 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
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action has so moved, 103 and need only exercise personal jurisdiction
over named plaintiffs. 104 Although class members may also have
compensatory claims against the defendant, the court can certify the
punitive damage issue for separate class action treatment. 105
Named plaintiffs representing the punitive damage class can then
present to the jury evidence relevant to punitive damage issues, such
as the defendant's wealth, the nature and number of injuries allegedly caused by the defendant's wrongful act, and the extent to which
the defendant's conduct was malicious. 106 If the jury finds the defendant liable for punitive damages, the court will ask it to award a
sum to punish the defendant once for all potential claimants. 107 The
sum awarded can then be allocated according to an equitable
formula approved by the court 108 among class members who file
103. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
870 (1976); Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc);Federal Skywalk
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,423 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 894-95; Robinson v. First Natl.
City Bank, 482 F. Supp. 92, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stevenson v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 79, 81 (D.
Del. 1976). Contra Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) (court cannot certify
a class actionsua sponte). Zarhadnick was rejected in.Dalkon Shield. 526 F. Supp. at 895 n.18.
104. .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 905-07 & 905 n.71 ("adequate representation, and not
presence, is the foundation of due process in the class suit"); see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40-41 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356,364 (1921); Dosier v. Miami
Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d
248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962). Federal courts can also assume jurisdiction over a nationwide class
even when many plaintiffs are not within the jurisdiction of the district court. See, e.g., United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701-03 (1979).
105. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 (4)(c)(A) provides that "an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues . . . ." See, e.g., American Trading and Prod.
Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
·
106. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 920 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983).
107. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920.
108. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class
action). Claimants seeking their share of the recovery fund would be required to present'
evidence demonstrating that they are members of the punitive class. See Coburn v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1977); American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Damages could be apportioned by a master appointed
pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 53. Coburn, 17 F.R.D. at 47. The formula for apportionment
could be a straight pro rata share based on the total number of claimants, or a pro rata share
based on the amount of compensatory damages recovered by a claimant relative to those secured by others. .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920 n.183. The second formulation is more
appropriate because allocation in proportion to actual recovery accords with the rule that punitive damages are generally not recoverable unless the plaintiff can show actual loss. See D.
DOBBS,supra note 16, § 3.9, at 208. A plaintiff would not be a member of the punitive damage
class unless he or she had obtained a compensatory recovery against the defendant. Thus, the
determination of punitive liability would be "followed by separate proof of the amount of each
valid claim and proportionate distribution of the funds." Advisory Committee Comments, 39
F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966).
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claims "at the end of some reasonable period of time." 109
D. Advantages of a Rule (23)(b)(J)(B) Class Action for Punitive
.Damages

A class action for punitive damages secures the plaintifrs interests in the limited recovery fund, protects the defendant, and promotes judicial economy. It protects plaintiffs' interests in three ways.
First, a class action tried in a single forum will insure that all plain. tiffs have an equal opportunity to assert their punitive claims. 110
Thus, "[w]hile this coordination will prevent any one plaintiff from
receiving an individual 'windfall' punitive damage award, it will also
insure the right of all plaintiffs to some proportionate share of any
punitive damage recovery." 111 Second, a class action prorates the
109. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920. In a footnote to this comment, the court observed
that "(t]he class necessarily will close at some time. However, in light of the existence of a
statute of limitations, the number of claimants, which is increasing today, will dwindle to a
minimal or nonexistent number at some definite point in the future." 526 F. Supp. at 920
n.184.
110. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1186 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class);
Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, at (2.7]. "The courts should be looking to achieve the fundamental fairness which is essential to the maintenance of the judicial system. At a time when
mass accidents occur with increasing frequency, the courts should strive to find alternatives
which will allow members of a class to redress a mass wrong as rapidly, as inexpensively, and
as fairly as possible." Co=ent, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Litigation of Mass Air
Crashes, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425 (1976) (footnote omitted).
111. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other
gr.ounds sub nom Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 103 S.
Ct. 817 (1983). However, one Note argues that allowing awards to go to plaintiffs who sue
early will encourage efficient litigation by rewarding prompt prosecution of claims. Note,
supra note 11, at 1811-12. This approach subordinates legitimate claims to the varying diligence of counsel, as well as to other circumstances that might delay an action. See Putz &
Astiz, supra note 12, at 6 n.27. Moreover, the judicial system would sanction an unseemly race
to the courthouse by placing a premium on this sort of efficiency. See Federal Skywalk Cases,
93 F.R.D. 415,424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Corburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977),
Some litigants might contend that their individual interest in control of the litigation precludes class certification. See Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D,
Va. 1975); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Note, Mass Accident
Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1634 (1972); Note, supra note 89, at 397. However,
because the interest in individual control is an articulated concern only with respect to a Rule
23(b)(3) class action, a court certifying a class action for punitive damages is not required to
consider a claimant's interest in individual control. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175,
1188-89 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 343 (1982); Note, supra
note 89, at 400-01. Moreover, "(b]ecause of the possible savings in litigation costs to individual
class members, it may even be more accurate to assume that many of the class members would
be willing to sacrifice individual control to gain the benefit of those savings." Note, supra note
89, at 399; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(where problems inherent in individual litigation are great, individual class members "have
almost no interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions."),
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cost of litigation among class members, 112 thus reducing the likelihood that individual plaintifrs attorneys will be outmaneuvered by
"litigation-wise corporate defendants." 113 Finally, it reduces conflicts of interest among plaintiffs' counsel. 114
A class action for punitive damages also protects the defendant.
First, and most important, it prevents bankruptcy because a single
resolution of the punitive damages issue would allow careful consideration of the total award needed to punish a wrongdoer and to deter
others. 115 Second, the class action device protects the defendant by
eliminating costly multiple litigation of the punitive damage issue. 116
In addition, the class action for punitive damages promotes judicial economy by avoiding numerous law suits involving the same
facts, issues, and defendants. Because multiple trials of complex issues severely burden the court system, 117 public policy opposes mul112. See, e.g., Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185 (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F.Supp. 887, 918 n.172 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
113. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 921; see also O'Toole, Special Aspects of Class Actions,
in CLASS ACTIONS [11.6] (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1974) (class actions
eradicate disparity between small plaintiff and large defendant).
114. If a lawyer represents two clients, one with an early trial date and another with a later
date, and both face a limited fund, the attorney can zealously pursue the first client's claim
only to the detriment of the second. This conflict produces an ethical dile=a, see ABA
Disciplinary Rule No. 5-105, that is resolved by a mandatory class action in which both plaintiffs would pursue their claims at the same time. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 425;
Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 895 n.22.
115. "Probably the best use to which punitive damages could be put is a co=on fund
used to help correct the defendant's misdeed to society as a whole, as with 'fluid recoveries' in
class action suits." Note, supra note 11, at 1799; see Putz & Astiz, supra note 12, at 23 ("[T]he
problem of arriving at a rational determination of punishment to be imposed on the defendant
would disappear if all claims could be brought in a single action before one tribunal."); note 67
supra.
116. Co=ent, supra note 110, at 451. A defendant should prefer a judgment binding on
all class members when it wants to avoid the harassment of many suits. Klenk & Kelly, supra
note 69, at [2.7].
117. In Da/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983), the
court had spent nine weeks trying a single claim for Dalkon Shield product liability. "[A]ny
attempts to try all these cases would bankrupt the district court's calendar and result in a
tedium of repetition lasting well into the next century." 526 F. Supp. at 893. The court concluded that individual adjudication of the many claims for compensatory and punitive damages pending in California "would produce an unnecessary and unprecedented burden on
California's federal judicial system." 526 F. Supp. at 903; ef. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175, 1186 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (class action promotes judicial economy by focusing litigation in the court that must resolve major disputed issues), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342
(1982); Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (remand).
The class action itself does not impose an unusual burden on the court. An examination of
Rule 23(b) class actions in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia revealed that
"class actions have less impact on the court's workload than critics assert and at least in the
District of Columbia, class actions do not appear to place an overwhelming burden on the
federal district court." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CLASS ACTION
STUDY 4 (Co=. Print 1974). The study reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
number of class actions filed in the district court had increased by a factor of seven, rising from
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tiple suits.us A (b)(l)(B) class promotes this policy by resolving the
punitive damages issue in a single action.
III.

PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM

Certifying a mandatory class precludes further proceedings in
state courts on claims arising from the mass accident that is the subject of the federal class action. Consequently, mandatory class actions in diversity cases implicate basic principles of American
federalism. In a federal system, comity requires the courts of one
sovereign to act with deference to the courts of another. An injunction against further proceedings in an action previously initiated in
the state courts must surmount the obstacles posed by the Anti-Injunction Actll 9 and the nonintervention doctrine of Younger v.
Harris. 120
A.

The Anti-Injunction Act

The Anti-Injunction Act provides that a federal court may enjoin
state court proceedings 121 only "expressly as authorized by Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 122 In Federal Skywalk Cases, the Eighth Circuit
held that this statute prohibited a mandatory class action in a mass
accident situation. 123 The court noted the accepted principle that the
federal courts must construe the Act strictly against the granting of
sixteen in the fiscal year following the 1966 Rule 23 Amendments to 125 in 1972. Id. at S. In
any event, the court should find the class action unmanageable only if the issues it presents are
too complex. Administrative burdens alone should not defeat certification. Freeman, Requirementsfor Class Actions, in CLASS ACTIONS (3. 15) (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1974).
118. "[T]he avoidance of multiple litigation is often a goal of our procedural system, and
with good reason. The duplication of effort, time, and expense that results from such proceedings is wasteful." Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L. REV, 717,
756 1911;see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); C. WruoHT, HAND•
BOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 12, at 352 (1973); O'Toole, supra note 113, (11.6), at
11-4. Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 1 requires that the rules "be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
119. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1976).
120. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
121. It is now well-settled that the federal court may not circumvent the Act by enjoining
the parties, rather than the state court itself, or by use of similar subterfuges. See Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Hill v.
Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). On the injunctive effect of a mandatory class action, see
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Piambino
v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1330-31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980), This approach
has prevailed despite the inconsistency between the rules governing appealability of traditional
injunctions and class certification orders. See Note, supra note 35, at 1160.
122. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1976).
123. See 680 F.2d at 1181-83.
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an injunction, 124 and declined to apply the "in aid of jurisdiction"
exception. 125 Even allowing for the rigorous application of the statute, however, the exceptions for legislative authorization and aid of
jurisdiction appear to justify certifying a mandatory class.
1.

"Except as Expressly Authorized by Congress"

In Mitchum v. Foster, the Supreme Court defined the criterion for
determining when Congress has authorized an injunction against
state court proceedings: ''The test . . . is whether an act of Congress,
clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal
court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of
a state court proceeding." 126 The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
could not be "given its intended scope" without the federal power to
enjoin state court proceedings, and remanded the case for further
consideration of the nonintervention doctrine. 127 The Court has
subsequently distinguished other statutes of great public importance
by emphasizing the peculiar focus of section 1983 on remedying
abuses of state authority, noting the absence of congressional intent
to constrain the states by other legislation. 128
Congressional ratification is a prerequisite to the adoption of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 129 The Rules have the force of a
statute, 130 and may therefore bring mandatory class actions within
the ambit of the express authorization exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Like section 1983, diversity jurisdiction directly addresses
defects in American federalism. 131 In cases of direct and substantial
conflict, the federal rules override the comity principle of Erie RR v.
124. 680 F.2d at 1181, quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engrs., 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970).
125. The superficially attractive exception for protecting or effectuating thejudgment of the
federal court does not apply until after the court has entered a judgment. See, e.g., Essex Sys.
Co. v. Steinberg, 335 F. Supp. 298, 300, qffd. mem., 441 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1971); 17 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226 (1978).
126. 407 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1972).
127. 407 U.S. 242-43.
128. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (single state court case
cannot be enjoined pursuant to the antitrust laws) (plurality opinion); Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 330, 355 (1978).
129. Changes in the rules take effect ninety days after the Chief Justice reports them to the
Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
· 130. See, e.g., United States ex rel Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960 (10th
Cir. 1964).
131. Whatever its contemporary merits, diversity jurisdiction was intended to restrict the
power of the states to discriminate against nonresidents. See Bank of the United States v.
Deveauz, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3601 (1975); Moore & Weckstein, .Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 1 (1964).
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Tompkins .132 In the mass-accident context, staying state court proceedings in favor of a single federal class action does no more than
protect both plaintiffs and defendants against the improvident insistence on individual punitive damages by courts sympathetic to local
claimants. 133 Viewed as a remedy for arbitrary and inequitable assessment of punitive damages in diversity cases, the mandatory class
procedure falls well within the statutory exception defined by Mitchum v. Foster. 134

2. The "Necessary in Aid of Its Jurisdiction" Exception
Dissenting in Federal Skywalk Cases, Judge Heaney found it
"self-evident that an injunction to protect the ordinary scope of a
mandatory class action is 'necessary in aid of' the federal jurisdiction
over such a class." 135 The individual claimants constitute the class;
if they remain free to opt out of the federal action, the court has
effectively lost jurisdiction over the class. 136
This approach appears analogous to the Anti-Injunction Act
analysis adopted in the context of interpleader under Rule 22. 137
Rule 22 interpleader protects an individual's stake in a limited fund
132. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980): "The Federal Rules should be given their plain
meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis
developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies." 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. The Court viewed the Walker
case as not presenting a genuine collision between state and federal rules, and therefore applied the state rule for tolling the statute of limitations. On the applicability of Hanna v.
Plumer to Rule 23, see 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, at § 1758.
Such a "procedural" characterization of Rule 23 for Erie purposes does not involve serious
tension with the test in Mitchum. Deeming a mandatory class procedure a remedy for the
arbitrary and inequitable assessment of punitive damages, a remedy protected in diversity
cases by the federal rules, is consistent with both the formal criterion and underlying analysis
of both Hanna and Mitchum.
133. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 1972; note 22 supra and accompanying text.
134. In In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litg., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975), the court
rejected this exception to the Act as applied to an opt-out class, because such a class can be
given its intended effect without staying state court cases. The court left open the application
of the "authorized by Congress" exception in the case of a mandatory class. In Piambino v.
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. lOll (1980), the court rejected
this exception as applied to a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 23(d) but did not address the question whether mandatory class certification under Rule 23(b)(l) or 23(b)(2) might
be "authorized by Congress." The majority opinion in Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), did not discuss the possibility of this exception.
135. 680 F.2d at ll92.
136. This is an inherent feature of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class certification. Judge Heaney wrote
that
the implication of the majority view is that mandatory classes are not truly mandatory any member who has previously co=enced independent litigation is somehow not subject to the ordinary rules of such class actions . . . . If certification in a mandatory class
action is proper, as here it clearly is, then the ordinary rules of such actions simply preclude independent litigation of class claims in state or federal courts.
680 F.2d at ll91.
137. FED. R. C1v. P. 22; see Note, supra note 35, at 1159-60.
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against multiple claims, despite the procedure's inherent restraint of
state court proceedings. 138 The Federal Skywalk Cases majority rejected this analogy because "an uncertain claim for punitive damages against defendants who have not conceded liability . . . does
not qualify as a limited fund." 139 This analysis assumes that because
interpleader itself is unavailable, 140 the jurisdictional exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act is also unavailable. But if a limited fund
exists for Rule 23 purposes, the mandatory class procedure protects
the jurisdiction of the court under that rule in precisely the same
way. Future courts, following the Federal Skywalk Cases dissent,
should look to the realities of the litigation, and recognize that probable liability sufficient to create a limited fund under Rule 23 also
brings a mandatory class within the "in aid of its jurisdiction"
exception.
Even granting the somewhat dubious case for retaining punitive
damages in any circumstances, 141 the suggestion that a state might,
by such an action, better protect its citizens against tortious injury is
unsound; potential mass tortfeasors surely do not care by whom their
assets are consumed when they analyze the benefits and costs of their
behavior.
Moreover, a federal class action does not eliminate the state's
comparatively unimportant interest but only ensures the litigation of
the action in a federal forum. The role of diversity jurisdiction in
harmonizing the federal system, by directly restricting the authority
of the state courts, negates any claim that comity requires abstention
in mass accident cases. 142 The district courts do not invoke the
Younger doctrine whenever a defendant removes a pending action to
the federal system. A mandatory class action does no more than remove pending cases from the state courts in the same manner.
B. Mandatory Class Actions and Younger v. Harris
If the Anti-Injunction Act does not forbid staying state court proceedings, principles of "equity, comity and federalism" may never138. A casual reliance on this analogy, see Note, supra note 35, at 1159-60, is unwarranted.
Most of the cases enjoining pending state court proceedings involve statutory interpleader,
under 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which is expressly excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361 (1976). Injunctions pursuant to statutory interpleader therefore come within the "expressly authorized by Congress" exception to the Act, and do not support an analogy based on
the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception.
But injunctions pursuant to Rule 22 interpleader are within the jurisdictional exception
and provide ample support for the analogy. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.3, at
22-37 (1982).
139. 680 F.2d at 1182.
140. See notes 56-57 supra.
141. See note 46 supra.
142. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
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theless militate against a federal injunction. 143 In identifying when
the doctrine applies, the Supreme Court has looked to the nature of
the state interest involved; 144 in deciding whether the facts justify an
exception to the doctrine when it applies, the Court has looked to
the good faith with which the state parties have brought the action
against which an injunction is sought. 145 Both considerations support certifying a mandatory class for punitive damages in the massaccident context.
1. JJoes Younger Apply?
Younger and its immediate progeny involved injunctions that
sought to restrain state criminal prosecutions, 146 proceedings close to
the core of a state's legitimate interest. 147 The Supreme Court has
expanded the doctrine's scope to encompass civil actions that resemble criminal prosecutions, 148 and the lower courts have refused to
issue injunctions, based on Younger, against actions where the state
is not a party. 149 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to declare that the doctrine applies to all civil actions in
143. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (remanding for consideration of
Younger doctrine after holding injunction not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act).
There is authority holding that Younger does not apply to an injunction against a civil suit
to which the state itself is not a party. See Puerto Rico Intl. Airlines v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d
1342 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp, 1300
(E.D. Wis. 1976). But the persuasive weight of authority rejects this simplistic distinction. The
Supreme Court has never held that Younger does apply to all state court proceedings, but it
has steadily broadened the doctrine's reach. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (child
custody proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt proceeding);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (state-initiated nuisance suit). Lower federal
courts have applied the doctrine to private civil actions. See Lamb Enters. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d
1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); Louisville Area Inter-faith Comm. for United
Farm Workers v. Nottingam Ltd., 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976); Neebuhr v. Bayer, 502 F.
Supp. 1216 (N.D. Ohio 1980). This result is more consistent with the spirit of comity underlying the doctrine. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591,
682 (1975); Comment, Limiting the Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF, L.
REV. 1318, 1320, 1343-45 (1979).
144. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54; 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE supra note 125, § 4255, at 578 ("[T)he general understanding has been that to obtain relief in a case to which Younger applies there must be a
showing of bad faith or harassment . . . .").
146. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
147. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion) ("the public interest in law enforcement" overrides
claim of reporter's privilege).
148. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (state interest in preventing welfare
fraud); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt action); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Younger applies to quasi-criminal public nuisance suit brought by the
state).
149. See note 143 supra.
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state courts. 150 Punitive damage actions for mass accidents outside a
federal diversity class action offer a particularly attractive candidate
for clarifying the reservation in holding as well as dicta.
The only state interest in separate punitive damage awards is enriching its own citizens at the expense of compensating other states'
citizens, as well as many of its own, for serious injuries.
2.

Good Faith

Viewed realistically, the pursuit of individual punitive damages
claims at the expense of a federal class action fails to reflect good
faith on the claimant's part. Punitive damages serve an exclusively
public purpose. 151 The pursuit of redundant punishment results
from the plaintiffs desire to pocket the entire windfall personally.
Such motives scarcely qualify as "good faith." 152 Skepticism becomes especially justified when individuals choose to pursue their
claims on the advice of counsel who would lose fees if the class is
certified. 153 Abstention therefore appears inappropriate in the mass
accident context.
Even if federalism bars a mandatory class, the federal courts can
take steps to minimize the burdens of multiple adjudications. First,
the federal court should immediately enjoin, pending the certification decision, any state proceedings not already commenced. 154 Second, the court should certify an opt-out class action if absention or
the Anti-Injunction Act preclude a mandatory class. 155 The class action should then proceed as rapidly as possible, so as to minimize the
incentive to opt out by maximizinB the chance that the class judgment will consume the limited fund before an individual plaintiff
can bring his claim to trial.
CONCLUSION

A court may conclude that punitive claims against a defendant
produce one of two types of limited fund. First, applicable law may
150. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,444 n.8 (1977) ("[W]e have no occasion
to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation . . . .").
151. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
152. See note 22 supra and accompanying text ("an unseemly race to the courtroom door
with monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgments for the rest").
153. See Note, supra note 35, at 1148.
154. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 125, § 4251, at 534 ("[T]he
settled rule has long been that the statute applies only to injunctions against pending proceedings and does not bar an injunction against the initiation of state proceedings in the future.").
Both injunctions and declaratory relief are available from federal courts regarding threatened,
rather than pending, state proceedings. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (permanent injunction); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory relief).
155. In Federal Skywalk Cases, for example, Judge Wright, on remand, certified an opt-out
class. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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limit punitive recovery. Second, the court may obtain evidence
showing that multiple punitive awards will bankrupt the defendant.
In either case, early judgments for some plaintiffs will preclude punitive recovery for later claimants; bankruptcy would have the additional effect of precluding the compensatory recovery of late-suing
plaintiffs. To protect plaintiffs' interests, the court should certify a
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action for punitive damages. Rule 23(b)(l)(B)
solves the limited fund problem by joining and protecting all interested plaintiffs, by insuring that the punitive judgment against the
defendant will be well-calibrated, and by promoting judicial economy. Moreover, a careful anaylsis of the Anti-Injunction Act and
the Younger doctrine indicates that principles of federalism do not
preclude this class action solution.

